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Institutional holdingsForeign ﬁrms face enormous obstacles in attracting investors and analysts
when issuing securities in the United States. We use US-listed Chinese ﬁrms
as our research sample and ﬁnd that ﬁrms that hire top executives (i.e., Chief
Executive Oﬃcer [CEO] or Chief Financial Oﬃcer [CFO]) with work experi-
ence in the US or educational qualiﬁcations from the US attract more US insti-
tutional investors and analysts. Further, we ﬁnd that CFOs’ US experience
dominates the results. Corroborating our results, we further ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with US-experienced CFOs are more likely to hold conference calls and volun-
tarily issue management forecasts, which suggests that CFOs with a US back-
ground are better at communicating with US investors and analysts and acting
in alignment with US norms compared with Chinese CFOs. Collectively, our
results suggest that hiring a CFO with a US background could facilitate
cross-listed foreign ﬁrms to lower US investors’ and analysts’ information
disadvantage.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Foreign ﬁrms that trade their equity on US stock exchanges face serious obstacles in attracting US inves-
tors and analysts due to the linguistic, procedural, and institutional diﬀerences between their home country
and the United States (Lundholm et al., 2014). This paper examines the favorable eﬀects of top executives’
US background in attracting US institutional investors and analysts using data from US-listed Chinese ﬁrms.
We predict that US-listed Chinese ﬁrms whose top executives have experience in working in the US attract
more US institutional investors and analysts. First, we conjecture that executives with a US background
perform better in communicating with US institutional investors and analysts. Due to their US experience,
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ple. More importantly, they may have a better understanding of what US investors and analysts expect, and
tend to act in alignment with US norms. Second, Beatty et al. (2013) ﬁnd that the likelihood of ﬁnancial fraud
in US-listed Chinese ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly lower if the Chief Executive Oﬃcer (CEO) was educated in North
America. Based on this evidence, we argue that hiring top executives with a US background can potentially
serve as a kind of reputational insurance mechanism. Executives who have worked in the US should better
understand the stringent regulations and pay more attention to their reputations in the US market than Chi-
nese executives. Therefore, ﬁrms that hire top executives with a US background may build an image of a well-
bonded corporation, and thus US institutional investors and analysts prefer to follow them. Third, hiring
executives with a US background could reduce the ‘‘psychological distance” between US investors and foreign
ﬁrms. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ﬁnd that investors in Finland prefer to hold and trade with ﬁrms with
CEOs of a similar cultural origin. We argue that top executives with a US background can reduce US inves-
tors’ psychological distance, and thus are expected to attract more US institutional investors. Based on at least
these three factors, we predict that US institutional investors and analysts exhibit a preference for US-listed
Chinese ﬁrms with top executives with US work experience.
Using US-listed Chinese ﬁrms as our research sample, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with top executives (i.e., CEO or
Chief Financial Oﬃcer [CFO]) who have work experience in the US attract more US institutional investors
and analysts than ﬁrms with Chinese top executives. Further, we ﬁnd that CFOs with US experience dominate
the results. To eliminate the endogenous innate ability argument, we control for CFO innate ability following
Giannetti et al. (2014) and the results remain consistent. We also use the two-stage Heckman method to elim-
inate selection bias and the results remain consistent. We acknowledge, nevertheless, that we cannot totally
resolve the endogenous ﬁrm-executive matching problem. As supporting evidence, we ﬁnd that the disclosure
practices of CFOs with US experience diﬀer from those of Chinese CFOs, with the former more likely to hold
conference calls and voluntarily issue management forecasts. The ﬁndings suggest that CFOs with a US back-
ground are better at communicating with US investors and analysts, and act in ways that are more consistent
with US norms.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study
to examine the eﬀect of executives’ US experience on disclosure practices, and consequently analyst following
and institutional holdings, using the setting of US-listed Chinese ﬁrms. Our results suggest that hiring top
executives with a US background can facilitate US-listed Chinese ﬁrms to mitigate home bias and obtain
US investment. The results lead to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that can help Chinese ﬁrms
to obtain international resources and may well be generalizable to all cross-listed foreign ﬁrms on US
exchanges.
This paper also extends the literature that examines managerial characteristics or traits (Bertrand and
Schoar, 2003; Bamber et al., 2010; Dyreng et al., 2010; Malmendier et al., 2011; Cronqvist et al., 2012, among
others). The upper echelons theory from the management literature argues that top managers often face com-
plex situations that do not have calculable solutions. As such, managers are more likely to make strategic
choices based on their personal experiences and backgrounds (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Hambrick,
2007). We observe a meaningful managerial characteristic in the context of US-listed Chinese ﬁrms, namely
CFOs with a US background, and ﬁnd that it has a favorable inﬂuence in attracting US institutional investors
and analysts beyond the previously documented ﬁrm-level determinants.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review and hypothesis
development. Section 3 explains our sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains our research
design and main results, while Section 5 shows robustness and additional tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.2. Literature review and hypothesis development
Foreign ﬁrms that trade their equity on US stock exchanges face serious obstacles in attracting US inves-
tors and analysts. Lundholm et al. (2014) ﬁnd that foreign ﬁrms that provide clearer disclosure have more US
institutional ownership, whereas Lundholm et al. (2014) consider reporting quality, we document that foreign
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three potential reasons, as follows.
First, top executives of foreign ﬁrms, especially CFOs, who have work experience in the US may perform
better in communicating with US investors and analysts. Due to their US experience, they generally have an
advantage in understanding US business culture and how to interact with US business people. More impor-
tantly, they are more familiar with what US investors expect and more likely to act in alignment with US
norms. Therefore, we argue that CFOs with US experience are better at communicating with US investors
and analysts.
Second, we argue that hiring top executives with a US background can potentially serve as a kind of
reputational insurance mechanism. Top executives who have worked or are currently working in the
US should better understand the stringent regulations and pay more attention to their reputations in
the US market than those who work in the Chinese market. Therefore, ﬁrms that hire top executives with
a US background may build an image of well-bonded corporations, and thus US institutional investors will
prefer to invest in those ﬁrms. Consistent with our reputational bonding argument, Beatty et al. (2013) ﬁnd
that the likelihood of ﬁnancial fraud in US-listed Chinese ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly lower if the CEO was
educated in North America.
Third, top executives’ US background may reduce the ‘‘psychological distance” between Americans and
foreign ﬁrms. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) use the unique setting of Finland where there are two cultural
origins and ﬁnd that investors prefer to hold and trade with ﬁrms whose CEO is of a similar cultural origin.
Consequently, top executives with a US background may increase US investors’ familiarity with foreign ﬁrms
and reduce their psychological distance, and hence these ﬁrms are expected to attract more institutional inves-
tors. Based on the above analyses, we predict that US institutional investors and analysts exhibit a preference
for US-listed Chinese ﬁrms with top executives with US work experience.
We use US-listed Chinese ﬁrms1 as our research sample. China is geographically and culturally distant
from the US. China’s legal system originated from Roman Civil Law and diﬀers from US Common Law.
Allen et al. (2005) compare overall investor protection in mainland China with the countries included in La
Porta et al. (1998). They ﬁnd that mainland China is rated one of the worst and the US one of the best ﬁnan-
cial markets in terms of investor protection. Therefore, there is a signiﬁcant gap between China and the US,
and Chinese ﬁrms may face considerable diﬃculty in attracting US investors and analysts. We use US-listed
Chinese ﬁrms as our research sample to examine whether hiring executives with US experience could help
ﬁrms to attract US investors and analysts.
Based on the above analysis, we state our hypotheses as follows:
H1: US-listed Chinese ﬁrms with top executives who have worked in the US attract more institutional
ownership.
H2: US-listed Chinese ﬁrms with top executives who have worked in the US attract higher analyst
following.3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Our sample period is 2006-2012. We compile a sample of US-listed Chinese ﬁrms from various sources: (1)
Wind database, (2) Bank of New York, which provides a list of ADRs on its website, (3) Sina Finance website,
and (4) Compustat. We exclude ﬁrms that are headquartered outside mainland China by reviewing the cor-
porate proﬁles. We also exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms. As a result, our ﬁnal sample comprises 213 US-listed Chinese
ﬁrms.
Generally, the CFO, Investor Relations Oﬃcer or Vice President of Investor Relations takes charge of
investor relations development and mostly communicates with analysts and institutional investors. We hand
collect the proﬁles of all of the top executives from ﬁrms’ annual reports and proxy statements and ﬁnd that1 Based on the closing price on 19 Sep 2014, the overall market value of Chinese ﬁrms’ trading equities in the US is more than 1.4 trillion
dollars, which is higher than Spain’s total GDP for the whole of 2013 (i.e., 1.36 trillion dollars).
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President of Investor Relations. Therefore, we mainly focus on two top executives: (1) the CFO, who is in
charge of information disclosure and communicating with analysts and institutional investors; and (2) the
CEO, who takes overall charge of corporate management. We manually extract information on the CEOs’
and CFOs’ work experience and educational background from SEC ﬁlings, such as annual reports and proxy
statements.
Financial data are extracted from Compustat. Analyst data are obtained from Institutional Broker’s
Estimate System (IBES). Institutional investor data are taken from TR 13f. We hand collect all of the required
information from 10-Ks, 20-Fs, and proxy statements ﬁled by Chinese ﬁrms during the sample period,
including insider ownership (holdings by the ﬁrms’ oﬃcers and directors), foreigner blockholders (non-
Chinese owners with 5% ownership or higher), board characteristics (board size, board independence), and
whether the CEO is the founder of the ﬁrm. We also hand collect the conference call and management forecast
data from current reports (i.e., 8 k, 6 k). The variable deﬁnitions are summarized in Appendix A.
Table 1 Panel A describes the distribution of ﬁrm-year observations by year. It shows that approximately
40% of CEOs or CFOs have worked in the US. Panel B shows the distribution of ﬁrm-year observations by
Fama-French industry categories. It shows that US-listed Chinese ﬁrms are concentrated in the manufacturing
and business equipment industries, with 28 (13%) and 77 (36%) of ﬁrms, respectively. Panel C describes the
distribution of sample ﬁrms by listing method. In our sample, 88 ﬁrms are listed on exchanges via reverse
mergers and 125 through the IPO process, and among the latter, 101 ﬁrms are listed by issuing American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs).Table 1
Distribution of observations.
Year #Obs #WorkUS Percent (%)
Panel A: Distribution of firm-year observations during the sample period
2006 50 18 36.00
2007 89 33 37.08
2008 129 45 34.88
2009 146 65 44.52
2010 180 84 46.67
2011 165 78 47.27
2012 136 58 42.65
Total 895 381 42.57
Fama-French industry classiﬁcation #Firms #Firm-year obs
Panel B: Distribution of firms by Fama-French industry classification
Consumer non-durables 16 72
Consumer durables 7 28
Manufacturing 28 120
Oil, gas, and coal extraction and products 7 31
Chemicals and allied products 9 33
Business equipment 77 336
Wholesale, retail, and some services 15 50
Healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs 22 94
Other 32 131
Total 213 895
Listing method Freq. Percent
Panel C: Distribution of firms by listing method
Reverse merger 88 41.31
ADRs 101 47.42
Direct listing 24 11.27
Total 213 100
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erage (#Analysts) and number of institutional investors (#InstOwners) are 5.55 and 40.82, respectively, and
the maximum values for Analysts and #InstOwners are 54 and 415, respectively. The mean of institutional
ownership (%InstHolding) is 15.46% and the maximum value is 99.43%. We also provide the statistics for ﬁrm
size (Size), board size (BoardSize), insider ownership (InsiderOwn), the proportion of independent directors
on the board (Independence), and ﬁnancial indicators such as return on assets (ROA), leverage (Lev) and
the book-to-market ratio (BMR).
Table 2 Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for the discrete variables. We construct a dummy vari-
able, WorkUS, to capture top executives’ work experience in the US, which equals 1 if the CEO or CFO
has worked in the US, and otherwise 0. We construct another dummy variable, WorkOverseas, to capture
executives’ work experience outside mainland China, excluding the US. WorkOverseas equals 1 if the CEO
or CFO has worked overseas excluding the US, and otherwise 0.
Panel B shows that 43% of observations have CEOs or CFOs who have worked in the US, and 38% of
observations have CEOs or CFOs who have worked in other countries or regions outside mainland China,
excluding the US. Overall, this means that 80% of ﬁrm-year observations have top executives who have
worked overseas, and 20% of ﬁrm-year observations have top executives who have worked only in China
mainland.
We construct two variables, CEOworkUS and CFOworkUS, to explicitly capture CEOs’ and CFOs’ work
experience in the US, respectively. Correspondingly, we construct another two variables, CEOWorkOverseasTable 2
Descriptive statistics.
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables
#Analysts(unlogged) 895 5.55 8.20 0 54
#Analysts(logged) 895 1.25 1.11 0 4.01
InsiderOwn 895 36.95 22.80 0 95.10
Size 895 5.60 1.48 2.23 12.76
BMR 895 3.16 14.06 0.10 25.36
BoardSize 895 6.41 1.91 1 14
Independence 895 0.56 0.15 0 1
ROA 895 0.05 0.18 (1.73) 0.66
Lev 895 0.34 0.22 0.02 1.27
#InstOwners(unlogged) 716 40.82 47.92 1 415
#InstOwners(logged) 716 3.18 1.10 0.69 6.03
%InstHolding 716 15.46 18.17 0.00028 99.43
Call 895 2.54 1.68 0 6
MF 895 2.14 2.37 0 17
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for dummy variables
WorkUS 895 0.43 0.49 0 1
WorkOverseas 895 0.38 0.49 0 1
CEOworkUS 895 0.16 0.37 0 1
CFOworkUS 895 0.36 0.48 0 1
CEOWorkOverseas 895 0.10 0.30 0 1
CFOWorkOverseas 895 0.35 0.48 0 1
CEOeduUS 895 0.18 0.38 0 1
CFOeduUS 895 0.47 0.50 0 1
CEOeduOverseas 895 0.09 0.29 0 1
CFOeduOverseas 895 0.24 0.43 0 1
CEOpreIPO 895 0.82 0.39 0 1
CFOpreIPO 895 0.54 0.50 0 1
Founder 895 0.69 0.46 0 1
Blockholder 895 0.57 0.50 0 1
Independence 895 0.56 0.15 0 1
RM 895 0.40 0.49 0 1
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respectively. Panel B shows that 16% of the CEOs and 36% of the CFOs in our sample have worked in the US,
and 10% of CEOs and 35% of CFOs have worked overseas but not in the US. This means that the percentages
of CEOs and CFOs in our sample who have worked only in mainland China are 73% and 29%, respectively.
We also extract the investment banking experience of CEOs and CFOs in their early careers and ﬁnd that
12.96% of CFOs have worked in an investment bank, while the percentage for CEOs is only 1.45%.
We use the abovementioned variables as primary indicators in our main tests. As a robustness check, we
construct another series of variables to capture CEOs’ and CFOs’ US or overseas experience based on their
educational background rather than their career path. First, we construct the variables CEOeduUS and
CFOeduUS to capture whether the CEO and the CFO were educated in the US. Then, we construct another
two variables, CEOeduOverseas and CFOeduOverseas, to capture whether the CEOs and CFOs were edu-
cated abroad but excluding the US. The percentages of CEOs who were educated in the US and other foreign
countries or regions are 18% and 9%, respectively. Correspondingly, the percentages for CFOs are 47% and
24%, respectively. This means that 73% of CEOs and less than one-third of CFOs had their education in main-
land China. The CFOs are clearly more internationalized than the CEOs in our sample.
We also manually collect data on CFOs’ undergraduate universities or institutions. In summary, 15.53% of
CFOs graduated from universities or colleges that are not included in the ‘‘211 program” in China; 30.28% of
CFOs graduated from universities that are members of the ‘‘211 program” but not the ‘‘985 program”; 18.66%
of CFOs graduated from the top tier universities that are members of the ‘‘985 program”; and 35.53% of
CFOs graduated from universities or institutions overseas.
We also summarize the highest educational qualiﬁcations of CEOs and CFOs. A signiﬁcantly higher per-
centage of CFOs (40%) than CEOs (15.76%) received an MBA degree, whereas 13% of CEOs received a Ph.D.
compared with 2.09% of CFOs.
We also construct two variables to measure whether the CEO or CFO joined the ﬁrm before the IPO, CEO-
preIPO and CFOpreIPO, respectively. We ﬁnd that 82% of the CEOs in our sample joined their ﬁrms before
the IPO; 69% of CEOs were the founder or co-founder of their ﬁrms; and 54% of CFOs joined before the IPO.
In Table 3, we describe the main dependent variables in our research. We collect institutional ownership
positions from Thomson Financial’s 13-F ﬁlings database. We measure institutional holdings using the most
recent data prior to the end month of ﬁscal year.2
The mean of #InstOwners is 40.82. Approximately 26% of observations have less than 10 institutional
investors, including 78 ﬁrms listed through reverse mergers; 48.5% of observations have between 11 and 50
institutional investors; 15% of observations have between 50 and 100 institutional investors; 9.4% of observa-
tions have between 100 and 200 institutional investors; and 1.2% of observations have more than 200 institu-
tional investors.
The mean institutional ownership is 15.46%; approximately 36% of observations have less than 5% institu-
tional ownership, of which 15% of observations were listed through reverse mergers; approximately half of the
observations have between 5% and 30% institutional ownership; and the remaining 15% of observations have
more than 30% institutional ownership.
We also provide a detailed distribution of the analyst coverage variable. We collect analysts’ data from the
IBES database. We measure analyst following using the most recent data prior to the last month of the ﬁscal
year and set missing analyst data to zero. The data for analyst coverage are left-censored at 0. Approximately
18% of observations have up to two analysts following the ﬁrm; 32% of observations have between 3 and 10
analysts; and approximately 17% of observations have more than 10 analysts. The maximum number of ana-
lysts following a ﬁrm in our sample is 54. This is generally consistent with our previous argument that it is
diﬃcult to attract analysts for foreign ﬁrms issuing securities on US exchanges.
Table 4 summarizes the results of the univariate analysis. The mean analyst coverage is 7.83 for the group in
which WorkUS equals 1 and 3.85 for the group in which WorkUS equals 0. The t-test results show that the2 If we set the missing institutional holdings data to zero, the results for institutional ownership remain consistent but the result for the
number of institutional investors disappears.
Table 3
Detailed summary of dependent variables.
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(1) WorkUS=1 (2) WorkUS=0 (3)=(2)(1)
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean t-Statistics
#Analysts(unlogged) 381 7.83 514 3.85 7.3943***
#InstOwners(unlogged) 311 48.93 405 34.59 4.0107***
%InstHolding (unlogged) 311 21.75 405 10.62 8.5165***
(1) CEOworkUS=1 (2) CEOworkUS=0 (3)=(2)(1)
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean t-Statistics
#Analysts(unlogged) 146 9.72 749 4.73 6.8950***
#InstOwners(unlogged) 118 63.24 598 36.40 5.6805****
%InstHolding (unlogged) 118 29.27 598 12.73 9.5909***
(1) CFOworkUS=1 (2) CFOworkUS=0 (3)=(2)(1)
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean t-Statistics
#Analysts(unlogged) 326 7.53 569 4.41 5.5823***
#InstOwners(unlogged) 263 48.19 453 36.54 3.1548***
%InstHolding (unlogged) 263 20.37 453 12.61 5.6245***
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ship. The results are similar if we replace WorkUS with CEOworkUS or CFOworkUS.4. Research design and main results
We examine the eﬀect of top executives’ US experience on analyst following and institutional investors
using the following models:#Analysts ¼ b0 þ b1 WorkUSþ b2 WorkOverseas þ b ControlsþYearþ Industryþ Exchangeþ e:
#InstOwners ¼ b0 þ b1 WorkUS þ b2 WorkOverseasþ b ControlsþYearþ Industryþ Exchangeþ e:
%InstHolding ¼ b0 þ b1 WorkUSþ b2 WorkOverseasþ b ControlsþYearþ Industryþ Exchangeþ e:We control for top executives’ other overseas experience to ensure the results are cleanly measuring
the eﬀect of US experience. As the literature documents that corporate governance can aﬀect analyst
coverage and institutional investor following, we use three proxies for corporate governance and control
for them in the regressions. We ﬁrst control for listing method (RM) to capture the quality of corporate
governance. Chen et al. (2013) suggest that for Chinese ﬁrms that have low bonding incentives and poor
governance, the reverse merger process provides an opportunity to access the US capital markets. We
also control for common corporate governance features: board characteristics and ownership structure.
Our second proxy for corporate governance is board independence. Corporate boards of directors mon-
itor top executives and make decisions about top managers’ compensation and retention. Board indepen-
dence has been widely used as a proxy of the board’s aggressive ability to curb opportunistic managerial
behavior in the presence of agency problems (e.g., Klein, 2002; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Our third
proxy for corporate governance is the existence of foreign institutional blockholders. We use an indicator
of whether the ﬁrm has one or more foreign block institutional investors (non-Chinese institutional own-
ers with 5% ownership or higher) to capture the quality of corporate governance, following previous
studies that suggest that institutional investors play an important monitoring role in reducing agency
costs.
We also include the following control variables: (1) InsiderOwn, which captures the holdings by the oﬃcers
and directors; (2) BoardSize, which measures the size of the board; (3) Founder, which captures whether the
CEO is the founder of the ﬁrm; (4) and Size, which equals the log of total assets, and several ﬁnancial indi-
cators including the book-to-market ratio, return on assets, and leverage.
The main results are shown in Table 5. We report robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted
for clustering at the ﬁrm level. Column 1 shows that the coeﬃcient of WorkUS is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 0.05 signiﬁcance level, which means that top executives’ work experience in the US has a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on analyst following. The coeﬃcient of WorkOverseas is insigniﬁcant, which suggests that
executives’ work experience in other countries or regions does not beneﬁt the ﬁrms by attracting analysts
in the US market. Consistent with our expectation, the coeﬃcients of Blockholder, Independence, Foun-
der, Size, and ROA are positive and signiﬁcant. Columns 2 and 3 show that the coeﬃcients of WorkUS
are positive and signiﬁcant at the 0.01 signiﬁcance level, which means that top executives’ work experi-
ence in the US has a positive eﬀect on both the number of institutional investors and their level of
ownership.
Next, to examine whether executives’ US work experience dominates the results, we construct two new vari-
ables to separately capture CEOs’ and CFOs’ work experience in the US. Correspondingly, we construct two
variables to explicitly capture CEOs’ and CFOs’ work experience in other countries or regions outside the Chi-
nese mainland, but excluding the US. We predict that CFOs’ US experience is relatively inﬂuential in our
research, because CFOs normally take charge of information disclosure and communication with analysts
and institutional owners. Table 6 shows that, consistent with our prediction, CFOs’ US experience dominates
the results.
Table 5
Eﬀect of executives’ US experience on analysts and institutional investors.
(1) (2) (3)
#Analysts #InstOwners %InstHolding
WorkUS 0.260** 0.300*** 0.670***
(2.314) (3.423) (3.734)
WorkOverseas 0.008 0.041 0.049
(0.064) (0.492) (0.256)
RM 0.020 0.123 0.273
(0.122) (1.087) (0.995)
Blockholder 0.369*** 0.207*** 1.039***
(3.289) (3.124) (5.867)
InsiderOwn 0.000 0.004** 0.004
(0.009) (2.361) (1.084)
Founder 0.367*** 0.216** 0.144
(2.643) (2.527) (0.731)
BoardSize 0.087** 0.011 0.166***
(2.256) (0.391) (2.703)
Independence 1.764*** 0.813*** 1.358**
(4.202) (2.800) (2.260)
Size 0.603*** 0.611*** 0.434***
(8.510) (14.003) (4.094)
BMR 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.033*
(3.542) (4.489) (1.919)
ROA 0.879*** 0.767** 1.277*
(2.646) (2.432) (1.916)
Lev 0.219 0.222 0.302
(0.684) (1.012) (0.496)
Constant 3.571*** 1.840*** 9.671***
(7.048) (3.263) (7.408)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Exchange Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 895 716 716
F 15.742 23.242 10.368
r2_p 0.236 – –
r2_a – 0.689 0.348
Note: This table reports the OLS regression results for the eﬀect of top executives’
US experience on institutional investors (columns 2 and 3) and the Tobit regression
results for the eﬀect of top executives’ US experience on analyst following (column
1). All of the variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Coeﬃcient estimates are provided
in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
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5.1. Controlling for discretionary accruals
We further control for discretionary accruals to capture earnings quality in the robustness analysis and
the results remain unchanged.3 We use the modiﬁed Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals. We do
not control for discretionary accrual based earnings quality in the main test to avoid further sample
reduction.3 The result is untabulated. Please request it from the authors if needed.
Table 6
Eﬀect of CFOs’ US experience on analysts and institutional investors.
(1) (2) (3)
#Analysts #InstOwners %InstHolding
CFOworkUS 0.199* 0.268*** 0.589***
(1.867) (3.521) (3.902)
CFOWorkOverseas 0.026 0.093 0.214
(0.213) (1.135) (1.146)
CEOworkUS 0.144 0.143 0.240
(0.915) (1.104) (1.025)
CEOWorkOverseas 0.053 0.126 0.390
(0.271) (0.883) (1.134)
RM 0.005 0.136 0.300
(0.028) (1.160) (1.065)
Blockholder 0.360*** 0.202*** 1.032***
(3.176) (2.948) (5.801)
InsiderOwn 0.000 0.004** 0.004
(0.098) (2.231) (0.922)
Founder 0.369*** 0.218** 0.146
(2.646) (2.569) (0.757)
BoardSize 0.084** 0.010 0.164***
(2.153) (0.359) (2.725)
Independence 1.743*** 0.839*** 1.462**
(4.167) (2.920) (2.535)
Size 0.601*** 0.610*** 0.433***
(8.519) (14.541) (4.214)
BMR 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.034*
(3.538) (4.473) (1.928)
ROA 0.911*** 0.791** 1.325**
(2.750) (2.444) (1.977)
Lev 0.226 0.279 0.479
(0.713) (1.289) (0.794)
Constant 3.571*** 1.858*** 9.737***
(7.077) (3.396) (7.685)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Exchange Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 895 716 716
F 14.985 25.449 10.513
r2_p 0.236 – –
r2_a – 0.690 0.350
Note: This table reports the OLS regression results for the eﬀect of CFOs’ US
experience on institutional investors (columns 2 and 3) and the Tobit regression
results for the eﬀect of CFOs’ US experience on analyst following (column 1).
All of the variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Coeﬃcient estimates are pro-
vided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. *, ** and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
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So far, we have shown that CFOs with US experience have a positive eﬀect on analyst following and insti-
tutional holdings. It could be argued that these beneﬁts may be due to CFOs’ exceptional ability, rather than
their US experience. To rule out this alternative explanation, we provide some evidence suggesting that US
experience may matter, beyond the executives’ ability. Most of the CFOs in our sample obtained their under-
graduate degrees in China. Following Giannetti et al. (2014), we measure CFO ability using the rankings of
their Chinese universities. We sort the universities into top tier, second tier, and third tier. As the results in
Table 7 show, the coeﬃcient of CFOworkUS is signiﬁcantly positive after controlling for university ranking,
which suggests that CFOs’ US experience matters beyond their innate ability.
Table 7
Alternative explanation: CFOs’ innate ability.
(1) (2) (3)
#Analysts #InstOwners %InstHolding
CFOworkUS 0.215* 0.358*** 0.794***
(1.696) (3.690) (3.630)
CFOWorkOverseas 0.103 0.005 0.326
(0.593) (0.049) (1.350)
CEOworkUS 0.236 0.006 0.229
(1.065) (0.039) (0.960)
CEOWorkOverseas 0.278 0.453*** 1.243***
(0.990) (3.544) (4.690)
CFOunivRank 0.201** 0.031 0.097
(2.118) (0.628) (0.777)
RM 0.297 0.320** 0.594*
(1.471) (2.366) (1.876)
Blockholder 0.487*** 0.227** 1.231***
(3.264) (2.609) (5.237)
InsiderOwn 0.001 0.004* 0.005
(0.383) (1.680) (0.980)
Founder 0.347** 0.235** 0.130
(2.098) (2.069) (0.518)
BoardSize 0.090** 0.042 0.287***
(2.071) (1.365) (3.630)
Independence 1.324*** 0.561 0.409
(3.200) (1.465) (0.520)
Size 0.621*** 0.630*** 0.536***
(7.927) (16.188) (5.002)
ROA 0.609 0.495 1.336
(1.471) (1.438) (1.479)
Lev 0.640 0.698*** 1.169
(1.635) (2.881) (1.532)
Constant 3.975*** 1.716*** 9.160***
(6.724) (2.939) (7.283)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Exchange Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 577 451 451
F 11.887 29.799 12.876
r2_p 0.226 – –
r2_a – 0.718 0.438
Note: This table reports the results after controlling for CFO’s innate ability.
All of the variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Coeﬃcient estimates are pro-
vided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. *, ** and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
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The choice of hiring a CFO with US experience may be determined by corporate governance, the
existence of foreign large blockholders, and the CEO’s characteristics. We use the Heckman two-stage
method to control for this potential self-selection issue. In the ﬁrst stage, we design a model to exam-
ine the possibility of a ﬁrm hiring a CFO with US experience. We use CFOpreIPO as an instrumental
variable. Column 4 of Table 8 shows the results of the ﬁrst stage. The results are consistent with the
previous main results after controlling for lambda in the second-stage regressions (Columns 1–3 of
Table 8).
Table 8
Results of the Heckman two-stage regression.
Stage two Stage one
#Analysts #InstOwners %InstHolding CFOworkUS
CFOworkUS 1.235** 0.886** 1.216*
(2.316) (2.070) (1.841)
CFOWorkOverseas 0.042 0.084 0.180
(0.349) (1.011) (0.945)
Lambda 0.633* 0.384 0.394
(1.960) (1.497) (0.960)
RM 0.150 0.136 0.279 0.102
(0.992) (1.210) (1.031) (0.414)
Blockholder 0.436*** 0.251*** 1.119*** 0.147
(3.784) (3.836) (6.191) (0.987)
InsiderOwn 0.001 0.004** 0.005 0.001
(0.302) (2.305) (1.096) (0.160)
Founder 0.408*** 0.222*** 0.147 0.010
(2.923) (2.622) (0.753) (0.057)
BoardSize 0.070* 0.011 0.163***
(1.758) (0.407) (2.656)
Independence 1.583*** 0.827*** 1.485** 0.158
(4.011) (2.746) (2.450) (0.357)
BMR 0.050*** 0.033*** 0.029 0.037*
(2.844) (3.931) (1.603) (1.931)
Size 0.632*** 0.621*** 0.454*** 0.041
(9.261) (14.421) (4.330) (0.544)
ROA 0.929*** 0.775** 1.298* 0.138
(2.795) (2.427) (1.961) (0.403)








Constant 3.944*** 2.007*** 9.977*** 0.091
(6.901) (3.550) (7.592) (0.145)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Exchange Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 895 716 716 895
F 16.868 25.715 10.478 74.99
r2_p 0.231 – – 0.133
r2_a – 0.690 0.345 –
Note: This table reports the Heckman two-stage results. All of the variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Coeﬃcient estimates are provided
in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
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We test whether executives’ global investment banking experience has an additional eﬀect on the number of
analysts and institutional investors following the ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that CFOs’ global investment bank experience
has an additional positive eﬀect on analyst coverage.44 The results are untabulated. Please request them from the authors if needed.
Table 9
Eﬀect of CFOs’ US experience on conference call and management forecast frequency.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prob(Call) Prob(MF) Call MF
CFOworkUS 1.213*** 0.814*** 0.620*** 1.248***
(3.769) (3.439) (3.694) (3.608)
CFOWorkOverseas 0.015 0.287 0.175 0.321
(0.043) (1.037) (0.899) (0.859)
CEOworkUS 0.358 0.509 0.123 0.719
(0.656) (1.336) (0.668) (1.608)
CEOWorkOverseas 0.475 1.090** 0.416* 1.710***
(0.688) (2.232) (1.857) (3.173)
RM 0.108 0.043 0.345 0.364
(0.245) (0.136) (1.192) (0.828)
Founder 1.303*** 0.575** 0.836*** 1.225***
(4.381) (2.219) (3.844) (3.369)
Blockholder 1.130*** 0.098 0.411** 0.162
(3.413) (0.388) (2.409) (0.485)
InsiderOwn 0.003 0.016*** 0.004 0.026***
(0.351) (2.938) (0.883) (3.078)
Independence 1.459 1.161 1.428** 1.543
(1.610) (1.563) (2.290) (1.440)
Size 0.253 0.104 0.218* 0.279
(1.627) (0.845) (1.819) (1.460)
ROA 0.340 1.653** 0.659 2.304**
(0.522) (2.209) (1.506) (2.143)
Lev 0.477 0.379 0.013 0.233
(0.699) (0.637) (0.027) (0.249)
BMR 0.012 0.067* 0.026 0.083*
(1.014) (1.952) (1.583) (1.887)
Constant 1.365 0.656 0.294 0.499
(1.118) (0.681) (0.369) (0.343)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 895 895 895 895
F 9.798 8.100
chi2 151.6 124.2
r2_p 0.299 0.203 0.115 0.0991
Note: This table reports the logit and OLS regression results for the eﬀect of CFOs’ US experience on conference calls (columns 1 and 3)
and management earnings forecasts (columns 2 and 4). All of the variables are deﬁned in Appendix A. Coeﬃcient estimates are provided in
the top row and p-values in the bottom row. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
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We also use another measure to capture executives’ US background. We extract the executives’ educational
background from their biographies and construct the CEOeduUS and CFOeduUS variables to indicate
whether they were educated in the US. The results are similar to the main results.55.6. Other top executives’ US background
Generally, the board secretary is in charge of investor relations in Chinese listed ﬁrms. It is possible that
US-listed Chinese ﬁrms follow this custom and the board secretary functions as an IR specialist to commu-
nicate with investors and analysts. Therefore, we also test whether the board secretary’s US experience has5 The results are untabulated. Please request them from the authors if needed.
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no support for this eﬀect, which implies that CFOs play a critical role in communicating with analysts and
investors in US-listed Chinese ﬁrms.5.7. Are CFOs with US experience more likely to hold conference calls?
There is evidence to suggest that CFOs have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on companies’ ﬁnancial reporting (e.g.,
Geiger and North, 2006; Ge et al., 2010). We argue that CFOs with US experience may act more in alignment
with US norms in disclosure practices, such as holding conference calls, and thus may attract more US insti-
tutional investors and analysts (e.g., Kimbrough, 2005). Consistent with our expectation, we ﬁnd that (1) ﬁrms
with US experienced CFOs are more likely to hold conference calls, and (2) the frequency of conference calls is
signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms with US-experienced CFOs. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 9 report the results, which
provide direct evidence of how CFOs with US experience are able to help US-listed Chinese ﬁrms to attract
more US investors and analysts.5.8. Do CFOs with US experience voluntarily disclose more management forecasts?
Given that releasing management earnings forecasts is normal practice in the US, CFOs with US expe-
rience may act more similarly to domestic US managers in terms of their disclosure activities, such as vol-
untarily disclosing earnings forecasts, and thus attract more US institutional investors and analysts.
Consistent with our argument, we ﬁnd that (1) ﬁrms with US-experienced CFOs are more likely to volun-
tarily issue management forecasts, and (2) the frequency of management forecasts is signiﬁcantly higher for
ﬁrms with US-experienced CFOs. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 9 report the results, which provide direct evi-
dence of how CFOs with US experience are able to help US-listed Chinese ﬁrms to attract more US inves-
tors and analysts.6. Conclusion
We use US-listed Chinese ﬁrms as our research sample and ﬁnd that ﬁrms that hire top executives (i.e.,
CEOs or CFOs) with work experience in the US or educational qualiﬁcations from the US attract more ana-
lysts and institutional investors. Further, we ﬁnd that CFOs’ US experience dominates the results. To elimi-
nate the innate ability argument, we control for CFO innate ability by following Giannetti et al. (2014) and the
results remain consistent. We use the two-stage Heckman method to eliminate selection bias and the results
again remain consistent. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that we cannot totally resolve the ﬁrm–executive
matching endogeneity problem.
As supporting evidence, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with US-experienced executives tend to hold more conference
calls and voluntarily issue more management forecasts. This complements previous studies documenting
the eﬀect of information disclosure on analysts’ and institutional investors’ activities by looking beyond the
outcomes and identifying the core management drivers. Our results suggest that foreign ﬁrms attempt to lower
investors’ and analysts’ information disadvantage or psychological distance by hiring top executives with US
experience.
Our ﬁndings provide a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that facilitate US-listed Chinese ﬁrms to
obtain international capital or resources and the results may be generalizable to other foreign ﬁrms cross-listed
on US exchanges.Acknowledgments
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J. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 267–282 281Appendix A. Variable definitionsVariable Deﬁnition Data sourceWorkUS Equals 1 if the CEO or CFO has work
experience in the US, zero otherwiseHand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s websiteWorkOverseas Equals 1 if the CEO or CFO has work
experience overseas (including Hong
Kong, Taiwan and other foreign countries)Hand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s websiteCEOworkUS Equals 1 if the CEO has work experience
in the US, 0 otherwiseHand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s websiteCFOworkUS Equals 1 if the CFO has work experience
in the US, 0 otherwiseHand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s websiteRM Equals 1 if the company listed on the US
exchange by reverse mergerList of Chinese RM ﬁrms obtained from
the WIND database and the website of
SINA Finance. Double checked by
checking the history and headquarters of
the companyFounder Equals 1 if the CEO is also the (co-)
founder of the ﬁrmHand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the InternetBlockholder Equals 1 if the ﬁrm has a foreign
blockholder with a shareholding larger
than 5%Hand collected from annual reports and
proxy statementsInsiderOwn The shareholding percentage of insiders
(i.e., executives and board members)Hand collected from annual reports or
proxy statementsCEOWorkOverseas Equals 1 if the CEO has work experience
overseas (including Hong Kong, Taiwan
and other foreign countries)Hand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s websiteCFOWorkOverseas Equals 1 if the CFO has work experience
overseas (including Hong Kong, Taiwan
and other foreign countries)Hand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
the information from the ﬁrm’s websiteCEOeduUS Equals 1 if the CEO was educated in the
US, 0 otherwiseHand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s websiteCFOeduUS Equals 1 if the CFO was educated in the
US, 0 otherwiseHand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s websiteCEOeduOverseas Equals 1 if the CEO was educated overseas
(including Hong Kong, Taiwan and other
foreign countries)Hand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s websiteCFOeduOverseas Equals 1 if the CFO was educated overseas
(including Hong Kong, Taiwan and other
foreign countries)Hand collected from annual reports or
proxy statements. Double checked using
information from the ﬁrm’s website#Analysts Ln(1 + #analysts) Collected from IBES. The number of
analysts is zero if the data are missing in
IBES(continued on next page)
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%InstHolding Ln(100 * Percentage of institutional
ownership)
Collected from the TR 13f datasetSize Ln(total assets) Collected from Compustat
ROA Net income/total assets Collected from Compustat
Lev Total liabilities/total assets Collected from Compustat
BMR Total assets/market cap Collected from Compustat
BoardSize # of board members Hand collected from annual reports and
proxy statements
Independence # of independent board member/# of
board members
Hand collected from annual reports and
proxy statementsCEOpreIPO Equals 1 if the CEO joined the ﬁrm before
public listing, 0 otherwiseHand collected from annual reports and
proxy statementsCFOpreIPO Equals 1 if the CFO joined the ﬁrm before
public listing, 0 otherwiseHand collected from annual reports and
proxy statementsReferences
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